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This paper examines the evolving role of reserve requirements as a policy tool in China. 
Since 2007, the Chinese central bank (PBC) has increasingly relied on this tool for with-
drawing domestic liquidity surpluses, it being a cheaper substitute for open-market opera-
tions in this period of rapid FX accumulation. China’s reserve requirements have also be-
come more complex and have been used to address a range of other policy objectives, not 
least macroeconomic management, financial stability and credit policy. The preference 
for reserve requirements reflects the volume of China’s FX sterilisation and the asso-
ciated costs, in a quantity-oriented monetary policy framework faced with policy dilem-
mas and tactical concerns. The PBC often finds it easier to reach consensus on reserve 
requirements than interest rate decisions and enjoys greater discretion in applying this 
tool. The monetary effects of reserve requirements need to be explored not in isolation 
but in conjunction with other policy actions. Depending on the policy mix, higher reserve 
requirements tend to signal a tightening bias, to squeeze excess reserves of banks, to push 
market interest rates higher, and to help widen net interest spreads, thus tightening do-
mestic monetary conditions. There are, however, costs in using this policy tool, as it im-
poses a tax burden on Chinese banks, albeit banks seem to have passed through a signifi-
cant portion of these costs to their customers, mostly depositors and SMEs. However, the 
pass-through to bank customers appears to be partial.  
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkien varantovaatimuksien käyttöä rahapolitiikan väli-
neenä  Kiinassa.  Vuodesta  2007  alkaen  Kiinan  keskuspankki  on  entistä  enemmän 
käyttänyt avomarkkinaoperaatioiden sijaan varantovaatimuksia pankkisektorin likviditee-
tin  hallinnassa.  Varantovaatimuksista  on  samalla  tullut  aiempaa  monimutkaisempia  ja 
niitä on käytetty myös laajempien politiikkatavoitteiden, kuten makrovakauden, rahoitus-
vakauden ja luottopolitiikan, saavuttamiseen. Varantovaatimusten lisääntynyt käyttö ku-
vastaa  tarvetta  neutraloida  valuuttamarkkinat,  määräperusteisen  rahapolitiikkakehikon 
asettamia haasteita sekä taktisia pohdintoja. Kiinan keskuspankin on helpompi saavuttaa 
tarvittava konsensus varantovelvoitteiden kuin korkojen muutoksista. Tutkimuksessa pai-
notetaan, että varantovaatimusten vaikutuksia täytyy tarkastella yhdessä muiden politiik-
katoimien kanssa. Usein varantovaatimusten nostamiset viestivät rahapolitiikan kiristy-
misestä.  Varantovaatimusten  käyttäminen  politiikkatoimena  aiheuttaa  kuitenkin 
ylimääräisen veron luonteisen kustannuksen kiinalaisille pankeille. Pankit ovat siirtäneet 
huomattavan osa näistä kustannuksista asiakkailleen, lähinnä pienille ja keskisuurille yri-
tyksille  sekä  tallettajille.  Kustannusten  välittyminen  (pass-through)  on  kuitenkin  vain 
osittaista.  
 
Asiasanat: varantovelvoitteet, sterilointi, rahapolitiikka, korkomarginaali, veron kohtaan-
to, Kiinan talous 
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1  Introduction  
 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) has actively changed its statutory reserve requirement 
ratio (RRR) since the mid 2000s, more so than many of its international peers. The PBC 
has come to prefer this instrument over other sterilisation tools such as open market op-
erations based on such short-dated instruments as repos, foreign exchange swaps and cen-
tral bank bills (on the liability side) and outright sales of government bonds (on the asset 
side).
1 The backdrop for such a revealed preference is a persistence of large -scale injec-
tions of base money via purchases of foreign currency. The recent successive RRR hikes 
can be viewed as a form of ―quantitative tightening‖, akin to the quantitative easing by 
major central banks. 
This choice of instruments raises important policy questions. First, how impor-
tant has the RRR been as a policy tool in China? Second, why have Chinese policymak-
ers come to rely so heavily on this tool? Third, how effective is the RRR as a counter-
cyclical tool in tightening domestic financial conditions? Fourth, what is the size of the 
tax burden imposed by reserve requirements on banks and its likely distribution? Finally, 
what are the prospects for continued reliance on reserve requirements, given that the cur-
rent RRR is over 20%?  
This note reviews the recent developments in the PBC’s use of reserve require-
ments as a policy tool and attempts to answer these questions. A number of conclusions 
can be drawn from our analysis.  
First, since 2007, reserve requirements have been more intensively deployed in 
China as a regular policy tool. Both the magnitude and frequency of RRR adjustments 
have increased considerably in recent years. Relative to both GDP and the monetary au-
thority’s balance sheet, the scale of required reserves maintained by Chinese commercial 
banks has been among the highest in the world, given the large banking sector, wide cov-
erage of reservable deposits and high RRR.  
Second, since 2007, reserve requirements have become a preferred sterilisation 
instrument to withdraw liquidity from the banking system, partially replacing other open 
market operations eg in PBC bills. A major factor behind the increased use of reserve re-
quirements is the attempt to more effectively sterilise foreign exchange interventions at 
                                                 
1 In China, the discount window or standing facility has not been actively used in recent years. Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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reduced cost. This choice also serves the current Chinese monetary policy framework, 
which is still oriented to quantitative targets and features multiple objectives.  
Third, China’s reserve requirement system has become more complex in recent 
years and is often applied in conjunction with interest rates and other quantitative, regula-
tory and administrative measures to address a range of policy concerns such as counter-
cyclical tightening/easing, macro-prudential objectives and credit policy. The increased 
complexity of the reserve requirement system in part reflects some of the PBC’s tactical 
considerations. 
Fourth, any monetary effects of RRR changes are hard to separate from those of 
other policy measures. While reserve money adjusted for RRR changes better reveals the 
PBC’s monetary policy stance and often leads loan growth, whether a hike in the RRR 
tightens domestic monetary conditions depends on the sterilisation task at hand and other 
policy actions.  The constraint of higher reserve requirements  for bank lending seems 
more binding when initial excess reserves shrink below some threshold, restraining the 
subsequent  loan  expansion  while  leading  to  higher  and  more  volatile  market  interest 
rates. In response to the higher RRR, Chinese banks charge borrowers more and widen 
their net interest margins and net interest spreads, thus helping to tighten domestic mone-
tary conditions.  
Fifth, while reserve requirement hikes have enabled domestic monetary tighten-
ing with fewer rate hikes and so have alleviated the short-term policy dilemma, they have 
also increased the cost of bank intermediation in China, which may prove counterproduc-
tive to financial market development. The tax burden imposed on Chinese banks is esti-
mated at 0.3% of GDP, above that of Korea but below India’s. Banks appear to have 
passed through a significant portion of the burden to their customers, mostly depositors 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Yet bank shareholders may also bear 
part of the burden, if wider margins and spreads in part reflect increased risk premia. 
Our paper is organised as follows. The next section places in perspective the 
Chinese application of reserve requirements as a policy tool. Section 3 explores factors 
influencing the choice of this tool in China. Section 4 discusses the possible channels and 
effects of a higher RRR in tightening domestic financial conditions. Section 5 examines 
the tax burden, its incidence and other complications associated with increased reserve 
requirements, while the final section concludes by considering the medium-term pros-
pects for the use of reserve requirements as a policy tool in China.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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2  The evolving role of reserve requirements in China 
 
Among many policy purposes, reserve requirements in China serve first and foremost as 
a tool to drain liquidity in the context of large-scale FX interventions. We first detail the 
roles of reserve requirement as a sterilisation instrument as well as a tool serving credit 
policy and macroprudential policy in this section, before examining the role of a counter-
cyclical measure in more depth in Section 4.  
 
2.1  Large and frequent RRR adjustments 
 
Since the mid-2000s, China has used reserve requirements as a policy instrument much 
more frequently and intensively than before. From its establishment in 1984 to June 2003, 
the RRR was adjusted just six times, usually in the context of financial liberalisation (Box 
1 and Graph 1, left-hand panel). By contrast, between July 2006 and June 2011, the RRR 
was altered 35 times according to the PBC announcements, usually by 50 bps, averaging 
a change every two months over these five years. Between 2006 and 2008, the RRR more 
than doubled, from 7.5% to 17.5%. It changed ten times in 2007 and in 2008. During the 
more recent tightening cycle, the RRR rose by 600 bps from January 2010 to June 2011, 
to over 21% for large banks. China tops the global league, in terms of both magnitude 
and frequency of RRR variations (Graph 1, right-hand panel). In short, the RRR has be-
come a regular and actively used policy instrument of the PBC.  
 
2.2  A more complex system 
 
China’s reserve requirement system has also become more complex over time. The cur-
rent basic framework first took shape in 1998 and features a uniform RRR applied to 
most of the non-financial corporate and personal renminbi deposits, regardless of matur-
ity, with a separate and much lower RRR for foreign currency deposits and increased dif-
ferentiations across types of deposit-taking institutions. In addition, there is voluntary 
holding of excess reserves by commercial banks to meet their daily settlements (Box 1).  
Currently, the RRRs on local and foreign currency deposits differ markedly. The 
current benchmark RRR on local currency deposits exceeds 21% but is only 5% for for-
eign currency deposits. On the other hand, the required reserves on local currency depos-Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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its are remunerated at 1.62% but not on foreign currency deposits. Based on the one-year 
government bond yield of 2% in 2010, the tax burdens of reserve requirements on one 
yuan of local and foreign currency deposits are roughly on par with each other at 10 bps. 
Moreover, on several occasions, Chinese commercial banks reportedly were asked to de-
posit foreign currency with the PBC to meet the reserve requirements on their local cur-
rency deposits.
2 
In addition, reserve requirements differ across banks from time to time  and are 
based on various formal and informal rules.  In 2004, a bank’s specific RRR level was 
linked to its capital adequacy and asset quality on an ad hoc basis, possibly aiming to 
achieve  both  macro  and  micro  prudential  purposes  (Borio  and  Shim,  2007).  Chinese 
newspapers also reported that in early 2010, without official public disclosure, a term 
RRR hike was imposed on selected banks experiencing rapid loan growth, perhaps serv-
ing to support the PBC window guidance for monetary and macroprudential objectives.
3  
Moreover, rural and urban credit cooperatives have occasionally benefited from 
more RRR cuts and fewer RRR hikes than other deposit -taking institutions in recent 
years. The tailored RRR for these cooperatives is 600 bps less than that applied to large 
banks as of June 2011. Finally, lighter reserve requirements occasionally apply to regions 
that are remote, poorer and affected by major natural disasters. These last two features 
aim to serve the quasi-fiscal and credit policy purposes of favouring credit allocation to 
regions and agriculture.
4  
Since late 2008, the PBC has also adopted a more formal two -tier reserve re-
quirement system, where the RRR for the 6 or 7 largest commercial banks has since been 
200 bps above that applied to most other, smaller, commercial banks. This is on top of the 
differentiated reserve requirements for credit cooperatives discussed above. This two-tier 
system was perhaps intended to ease the heightened liquidity pressures on small banks in 
the global financial crisis, while redistributing the tax burden of reserve requiremen ts 
within the banking system.  
In early 2011, the PBC  introduced a pilot scheme of ―dynamic differentiated 
RRR‖. Under the scheme, the RRR for an individual bank varies on a quarterly, and 
sometimes even monthly, basis, taking into consideration its contribution to the deviation 
                                                 
2  http://www.nbd.com.cn/newshtml/20100121/20100121043513196.html . 
3 http://www.cs.com.cn/wh/03/200711/t20071113_1243482.htm . 
4 The last two features bring to mind the earlier US regime of differentiated reserve requirements.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
 
 
  11 
of aggregate credit growth from the historical trend, implementation of the government 
credit policy and other prudential indicators, such as provisioning, leverage ratio and 
capital adequacy (Box 1). The last component in turn is a sum of the basic capital re-
quirement, additional charges related to a bank’s systemic importance and countercyclical 
buffers. Such differentiated and complex reserve requirements suggest that the RRR has 
become a multipurpose instrument of monetary, credit and macroprudential policy.  
 
2.3  An international comparison 
 
The role of reserve requirements in sterilisation can be assessed by international compari-
son of its use across economies or by comparison with other sterilisation instruments de-
ployed domestically by the PBC over time. We first examine reserve requirements from 
an international perspective before taking a closer look at the PBC’s own sterilisation 
toolkit.  
From an international perspective, China’s level of required reserves is undoubt-
edly among the highest in the world. As a share of GDP, China’s level of required re-
serves is more than twice as high as advanced economies and most other emerging mar-
ket economies. It is also extremely high relative to the balance sheet of the PBC as com-
pared to international peers (Graph 2). On the other hand, China’s headline RRR is not 
the highest. For instance, the RRR on demand deposits in Brazil reaches as much as 45%, 
and the headline RRR in the Philippines, at 21%, matches that of China. Nevertheless, as 
will be discussed below, China’s large banking system and broad coverage of reserve re-
quirements ensure that its level of required reserves is by far the highest relative to GDP.
5  
It is of interest also to contrast the US and Chinese central bank balance sh eets 
and their bank reserves. Both balance sheets have expanded markedly in recent years, as 
bank reserves represent 40% to 50% of the respective balance sheets. The domestic asset 
purchase programme of the US Federal Reserve has resulted in a sizable increase in total 
bank reserves (to about 10% of US GDP), mostly in the form of remunerated excess r e-
serves. By contrast, large-scale foreign currency purchases by the PBC have been the 
                                                 
5 Another noted feature of China’s reserve requirements is that reserve requirements have hitherto not been 
used explicitly to tax capital inflows, in contrast to some other emerging market economies. Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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main source of China’s higher bank reserves (exceeding 30% of GDP) and are mostly in 
the form of required reserves (Filardo and Grenville, 2011).
6  
 
2.4  A favourite sterilisation tool 
 
From a domestic perspective, the PBC has come to prefer using reserve requirements as 
its main sterilisation tool to drain liquidity since the mid 2000s. It has preferred it not 
only at the margin but also as a partial substitute for other sterilisation tools.  
Firstly, in stock terms, required reserves have become more important than PBC 
bills outstanding. PBC bills, government deposits and reserve requirements have been the 
three most important channels for sterilising the monetary consequences of China’s build-
up of foreign exchange reserves.
7 They combined to fund 90% of its US$ 3.2 trillion of 
foreign reserves outstanding by June 2011, compared to just one third in 2003 (Graph 3, 
left-hand panel). Since late 2007, the balance of required reserves at the PBC has consi s-
tently overtaken PBC bills in immobilising the liquidity generated by reserves accumula-
tion. Whereas PBC bills and required reserves  each financed some 30% of China’s for-
eign exchange reserves outstanding in 2005, by June 2011 they funded 12% and 67%, 
respectively, of the much higher dollar assets at the PBC. Thus, the ratio of required re-
serves to PBC bills outstanding stood at 6:1 as of June 2011, compared to 1:1 in 2005.  
Secondly, in flow terms, changes in the RRR have to a large extent substituted 
the net issuance of PBC bills as a tool to absorb liquidity stemming from reserve accumu-
lation. This is evident in the right-hand panel of Graph 3 that compares different policy 
actions in annual flow terms scaled by the change in foreign exchange reserves.  
Finally, it is also useful to compare the impacts of the RRR and other sterilisa-
tion tools on reserve money. To compare various sterilisation tools, we follow two ap-
proaches adopted by the St Louis Fed to adjust reserve money, by translating the effects 
of reserve requirement changes into ―equivalent‖ changes in reserve money measured in 
                                                 
6 In the US, the ratio of excess to required reserves is about 10:1, while China’s is 1:10, given the unsteril-
ized asset purchase of the US Fed policy and the sterilised asset purchase of the PBC. Finally, while the 
asset purchases of the US Fed were intended to influence the yield curve and credit spread, those of the 
PBC were aimed at managing the exchange rate.  
7 Of course, the PBC has limited influence over government deposits that are subject to large seasonal 
swings in budgetary outlays and tax receipts. While not a liquidity fine-tuning tool, government deposits 
play an important role in draining liquidity from the domestic system. Indeed, the RMB20bn issuance of 
RMB-denominated MoF bonds in Hong Kong in September 2011 can in a way be interpreted as a cost-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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terms of open market operations and other policy a ctions (Burger and Rasche, 1977; 
Wang, 2010). The adjustment is given by the following two equations:  
 
1 1 1 * ) (       t t t t t D r r adj adj         (1) 
t t t D r r adj * ) ( 0           (2) 
 
where adj is the adjustment to reserve money following a change in reserve requirements, 
r the RRR and D the reservable deposit base.
 8   
These adjustments theoretically capture the amount of reserve money absorbed 
or liberated by changes in the RRR. A hike in the RRR, like a net issuance of PBC bills, 
drains liquidity from the system so as to reduce bank reserves available for new lending, 
other things equal. But the drained liquidity remains as a part of reserve money if not ad-
justed for RRR changes. On the other hand, an open market operation draining liquidity 
reduces reserve money. Therefore, the RRR-adjusted reserve money will place the effect 
of RRR hikes and PBC bill issuance on reserve money on a more comparable basis in 
terms of their respective roles in absorbing liquidity.  
The adjustment data show that the mix of sterilisation instruments has varied 
over time but is decisively tilted towards the choice of reserve requirements post-2007. 
Between 2003 and 2006, the PBC had relied heavily on central bank bill issuance as the 
main sterilisation tool to drain surplus liquidity (Graph 4 and 5). But since 2007, the PBC 
has relied more on the reserve requirement system as the principal tool for freezing li-
quidity, in partial replacement of open market operations. Indeed, the roles of reserve re-
quirements and PBC bills appeared to diverge after 2009, with RRR hikes withdrawing 
liquidity and net PBC bill runoffs injecting liquidity. In a way, the role of PBC bills in 
this episode had changed to fine-tuning, mainly smoothening liquidity fluctuations.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
efficient operation to sterilise the return of offshore renminbi, while supporting the development of Hong 
Kong’s dim sum bond market.  
8 The two St Louis approaches adjust reserve money at a point in time by capturing the cumulative effects 
of all the RRR changes from a given starting point. The two adjustment series have a correlation of 95% in 
China’s case for the period under consideration. Alternatively, one may also adjust the reserve money 
growth by considering the marginal effect of the RRR changes on a 12-month rolling basis (Shu et al, 
2008).  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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3  Why the active use of reserve requirements? 
 
Three related sets of factors help explain the more active use of reserve requirements as a 
policy instrument in China since the mid 2000s. They are (1) the challenges of absorbing 
large structural liquidity surpluses arising from sizable foreign reserve accumulation; (2) 
a quantity-oriented monetary policy framework with multiple and sometimes conflicting 
objectives; and (3) tactical advantages from the perspective of the PBC.  
 
3.1  Persistent need for large-scale sterilisations 
 
The sizable task to withdraw liquidity stemming from its sustained foreign reserve accu-
mulation brings home the need for permanence, low cost and no policy rate signal and 
thus heightens the appeal of reserve requirements over other sterilisation tools. China’s 
reserve accumulation has been among the largest in the world (Graph 6, left-hand panel). 
Indeed, the similar challenge could also be one key factor for several emerging market 
economies to resort to this tool (Graph 6, right-hand panel).
9 In response, the PBC has 
increasingly relied on RRR adjustments as a major liquidity draining tool from 2007 for 
three reasons: reserve requirements freeze liquidity in a more permanent fashion and at a 
lower cost to the PBC and relieve the PBC bill operations of a difficult dual role.  
First, reserve requirements withdraw liquidity on a more permanent basis than 
do the mostly short-dated open-market operation instruments (such as the repos and PBC 
bills). In the aggregate, reserve requirements and these open -market operation instru-
ments should achieve similar liquidity absorbing effects. At the bank level, however, 
short-term securities allow for more flexible liquidity management than reserve requir e-
ments, which may target and freeze bank liquidity more deeply, other things equal 
(Zhang, 2011).  
Second, reserve requirements are more cost efficient from the PBC’s point of 
view. With few exceptions, the remuneration rate on required reserves has been below the 
1-year PBC bill auction yield (Graph 7, left-hand panel). By this measure, the cost saving 
                                                 
9 In recent years, Brazil, China, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey 
have resorted to adjustments in reserve requirements. However, Thailand presents a noted exception where 
the Bank of Thailand refrained from relying on RRR hikes to sterilise its large foreign reserve interven-
tions. Also, reserve requirements have been applied as a Tobin tax on capital inflows in some emerging 
markets.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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for the PBC could be substantial. The gap between the auction yields on one -year PBC 
bills and the remuneration on required reserves point to a cost saving to the PBC at 0.2% 
of its total liabilities or 0.12% of GDP in 2010. Thus RRR hikes serve as a cheaper sub-
stitute for PBC bills. Of course, the flip side is that the banks lose income and assume 
more of the sterilisation cost. Section 5 will discuss the tax burden imposed by reserve 
requirements on the Chinese banking sector.  
Third, reserve requirements can drain liquidity without directly signalling on 
policy rate. The PBC bill auctions often aim to strike a delicate balance between manag-
ing liquidity and guiding market expectations by signalling policy rates. This dual role 
has evolved over time. Prior to 2007, the PBC mostly acted as a price taker in auctioning 
its own bills, with liquidity absorption as the priority. Since 2007, the PBC has become 
more of a price maker, aiming to steer the auction yield near the one -year bank deposit 
rate and to signal a prospective rate change, while generally leaving the auction volume 
to clear the market (Graph 7, right-hand panel).  
Reserve requirements thus have replaced PBC bills in recent draining operations. 
From late 2010 to early 2011, for instance, the PBC scaled down its bill issuance, partly 
because of rising secondary market yields on PBC bills above the auction yields. In this 
episode, the PBC allowed some of its maturing bills to run off, in order to limit both rises 
and volatility in the money market rates. By contrast, raising the RRR itself absorbs li-
quidity without directly signalling a policy rate move, though it may contribute to higher 
market interest rates over time, depending on other policy operations. Thus the draining 
task fell more heavily onto the RRR from 2007 to 2011, relegating PBC bills to smooth 
out market liquidity at margin. 
 
3.2  Monetary policy framework 
 
Over the past two decades, many central banks in advanced and emerging economies 
have shifted away from controlling monetary aggregates to a monetary policy framework 
oriented more towards inflation-targeting with the short-term interest rate as operating 
target.  The  role  of  reserve  requirements  has  been  on  the  decline  accordingly.  Some Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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economies (such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada) have either eliminated the RRR 
or set it at zero.
10  
In contrast, China maintains a monetary policy framework that inter alia targets 
broad monetary (M2 in particular) and aims at multiple objectives. This in part relates to 
the predominance of China’s banking sector in intermediation. In addition, the large pres-
ence of state companies and their favoured access to credit continue to impede the inter-
est-rate channel. Finally, the government still sets bank deposit and lending rates. Hence, 
the PBC relies more on quantity-based instruments (Lardy, 1998).  
However, the role of the interest rate may have expanded in recent years, in part 
owing to China’s two-track interest rate regime and growing fixed-income market. From 
2004, the government only sets the floors for bank lending rates and the ceilings for bank 
deposit rates, effectively regulating the minimum spread between deposit and loan rates 
(Ma, 2007). Banks have considerable leeway in pricing deposits and loans within these 
constraints, though the deposit rate cap is often considered binding. Over time, bond 
yields and money market interest rates respond more to demand and supply and interact 
with official bank rates in an evolving two-track interest rate regime.
11 
At times, Chinese policymakers have to deal with conflicting objectives. A case 
in point is the challenges associated with rising domestic inflation in the face of e x-
tremely low interest rates in major economies. A policy rate rise is contractionary but 
may induce additional capital inflows, partially offsetting the intended monetary tighten-
ing. The RRR may help reconcile such divergent policy objectives. For instance, if not 
fully remunerated, reserve requirements act as a tax on banks and thus hurt their profits, 
affecting cost of credit and possibly inducing them to widen the loan-deposit rate spread 
(Borio and Disyatat (2009); Montoro and Moreno (2011)), assuming that banks can pass 
reserve requirement costs onto their customers. If so, the financial conditions are tigh t-
ened without attracting excessive capital inflows.  
 
                                                 
10 The use of reserve requirements as a policy instrument has declined, in part because of its distortionary 
tax effect on financial intermediation, reduced predictability of monetary aggregates due to accelerated fi-
nancial innovation and the bluntness of RRR as policy tool. For an overview of monetary policy tools gen-
erally and reserve requirements in particular in both advanced and emerging market economies, see Borio 
(1997), Ho (2008), Mohanty and Turner (2008), Montoro and Moreno (2011), and Gray (2011). 
11 For a discussion of the evolving Chinese monetary and financial system, see Yi (2008 and 2009), Con-
way et al (2010), Wang (2011), Chen et al (2011), and He and Wang (2011).  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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3.3  Other tactical and governance considerations 
 
From the PBC’s perspective, the RRR may have a number of tactical advantages over 
other instruments in terms of operational autonomy. First, adjusting the RRR is perceived 
to affect liquidity within the banking sector only, without directly affecting the funding 
cost to borrowers at large. Thus it is often easier to reach consensus regarding RRR ad-
justments among Chinese policymakers so that policy decisions can be more timely than 
a policy rate change.  
Second, the PBC has greater discretion in implementing RRR adjustments. For 
instance, the differentiated and dynamic RRR framework links quarterly adjustments in 
the RRR to individual banks’ loan growth relative to the aggregate trend. The PBC also 
seems to have some discretion to intensify or suspend this scheme as needed, which can 
be seen as complementary to PBC window guidance. Moreover, the PBC may redefine 
the reservable deposit base at its own initiative to ease or strengthen effective reserve re-
quirements without altering the headline RRR. For instance, the reservable deposit base 
was extended to include some of the margin deposits (deposits as collateral for banker’s 
acceptances  and  letters  of  credit)  in  September  2011,  with  the  aim  of  curtailing  off-
balance sheet lending while signalling continued tight policy bias.  
Finally, reserve requirements enhance the role of the Chinese central bank in 
formulating  and  implementing  macroprudential  policy,  as  control  of  this  policy  tool 
clearly resides with the PBC. This is consistent with a new trend for central banks in 
many major economies since the global financial crisis.  
 
 
4  The monetary effects of reserve requirements  
 
As discussed, RRR adjustment has sometimes served as a countercyclical measure to 
tighten domestic monetary conditions, often complementing policy rate changes and in 
conjunction with administrative and regulatory measures such as window guidance, in-
dicative loan quota and loan-deposit ratio. An often observed pattern in recent years is 
that both the policy rate and RRR are adjusted in the same direction one after another, 
apparently aiming to reinforce the tightening or easing effects (Graph 8, left-hand panel).  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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Thus, it is often quite difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the effects of reserve 
requirements from other policy actions. For instance, an RRR hike itself does not neces-
sarily imply a tighter policy stance, depending on the sterilisation task and other policy 
actions. Hence any contractionary effects of a higher RRR will in part be shaped by the 
interactions among these policy measures. Finally, the channels of RRR adjustments in 
influencing domestic monetary conditions are not well understood and remain controver-
sial.  
 
4.1  Channels of transmission 
 
Conceptually there may be four interrelated channels for an RRR change to affect an 
economy’s monetary conditions. First, signalling policy intention — a hike in the RRR 
may signal a bias towards tightening, which may not indicate hikes in deposit and loan 
rates but can spill over to higher market interest rates through changed market expecta-
tions. Expectations about the policy stance may translate into expectations of the future 
thrust of other policy actions following an RRR hike. For example, recently we have seen 
market interest rates reacting more to the announcements about RRR changes than to the 
implementation.  
Second, raising the RRR can limit monetary growth and squeeze excess reserves 
if  not  fully  neutralised,  potentially  limiting  banks’  capacity  to  lend  over  time  and 
strengthening the expectation channel. The roles of excess reserves in the monetary con-
dition and bank credit remain controversial, as the Japan’s quantitative easing in 2001-
2006 has shown (Borio and Disyatat, 2009). In China’s case, the capital controls and two-
track interest rate regime may further hinder our understanding of the underlying mecha-
nism for this channel.  
Third, in response to a higher RRR, banks may adjust their portfolios over time, 
resulting in higher bond yields and money market rates in a two-track interest rate setting. 
For instance, He and Wang (2011) report that RRR adjustments affect money market in-
terest  rates  in  the  same  direction,  more  than  PBC  bill  auctions  but  less  than  official 
changes in benchmark deposit rates.  
Fourth, reserve requirements directly impose a tax on banks, making bank credit 
costlier and thus tightening monetary conditions (Borio and Disyatat, 2009). One special 
case is that increased reserve requirements may prompt banks to widen their loan-deposit BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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rate spread, assuming some pass through of the RRR cost to bank customers (Montoro 
and Moreno, 2011). This channel need not rely on the two-track interest rate assumption 
but it does assume banks’ ability to pass on the costs of reserve requirements.  
These mechanisms may interact to influence domestic monetary conditions. We 
first discuss the quantity effects by discussing the roles of excess reserves and other pol-
icy actions in Section 4.2 and the effects of RRR changes on the money multiplier in Sec-
tion 4.3. Then Section 4.4 looks at the price effects via both money market spillovers as 
well as changes in borrowing costs within the banking sector. The expectation channel is 
discussed as a link between quantity and price effects along the way, while the issue of 
cost pass-through will be explored in greater detail in Section 5.  
 
4.2  RRR-adjusted reserve money and excess reserves 
 
One way to investigate the intended monetary impact of RRR changes is to compare re-
serve money with or without the adjustment for RRR changes in revealing policy inten-
tions. Since the RRR-adjusted reserve money combines, in a single index, those PBC ac-
tions that affect the supply of reserve money (such as PBC bill issuance and foreign ex-
change interventions) with the actions that affect the demand by commercial banks for 
reserve money (such as RRR changes), the RRR-adjusted reserve money should better 
reflect the money policy stance than the unadjusted measure.  
Indeed, as the right-hand panel of Graph 8 shows, RRR-adjusted reserve money 
has been much more consistent with PBC policy statements (Shu and Ng, 2010; Garcia-
Herrero and Girardin, 2010). Its growth was much slower during 2007-08 when the PBC 
tightened, quickened significantly in response to the global financial crisis in late 2008 
and early 2009 but eased noticeably when monetary policy began a trend of normalisation 
going into the second half of 2009. In contrast, the unadjusted measure accelerated from 
the mid teens to 40% in the tightening cycle from 2007 to 2008 but slowed to single-digit 
territory during the monetary stimulus  between mid 2008 and mid 2009. As China’s 
monetary policy began to be normalised in mid 2009, its growth rate jumped instead.  
More importantly, growth of the RRR-adjusted reserve money has broadly led 
bank loan growth (Graph 8, right-hand panel). Our statistical tests strongly confirm that 
growth in the RRR-adjusted reserve money Granger-causes loan growth and not the re-Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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verse, suggesting that changes in the RRR may have influenced the capacity of Chinese 
commercial banks to book new loans (See Appendix A for details). 
Another closely related channel for RRR hikes to affect commercial bank lend-
ing is the freezing of liquidity otherwise available for loan expansion. Factors condition-
ing such effects include the initial level of excess reserves and other operations pursued 
in parallel, though this channel remains controversial (Borio and Disyatat, 2009). For in-
stance, if for some reason the initial slack in the system is substantial, banks can first run 
down their large excess reserves to partially offset the impact of a given RRR hike (Yu, 
2009). As their initial excess reserves move closer to some minimum threshold needed 
for settlements, another RRR hike can bite more. There are also distribution al issues. 
While the government controls the current level of excess reserves for the system, it can 
only influence their distribution across banks and size relative to bank deposits over time. 
The level of excess reserves varies both across banks and over  time in China. 
During 2010, for instance, excess reserves stood around 1.0% of deposits for large banks 
but were much higher for smaller institutions  — between 1.5% and 2.0% for mid-size 
banks, 3% and 4% for small banks, and 5% and 7% for rural credit cooperatives (Graph 
9, left-hand panel). One reason for the marked differences is that vast branch networks 
ensure the large banks a stable funding source — their extensive and cheap retail deposit 
base,  which  reduces  their  precautionary  demand  for  excess  reserves.  Another  reason 
could be the less than well-functioning of the Chinese money market. This in turn helps 
explain China’s two-tier reserve requirement system (Box 1) and why the Chinese rural 
credit cooperatives were exempted from a number of the recent RRR increases in recent 
years.  
Over the past ten years, aggregate excess reserves of the banking sector have de-
clined considerably, from around 7% of bank deposits in 2001 to 1% by mid 2011 (Graph 
9,  right-hand  panel).  While  a  full  discussion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  this 
marked declined may reflect a combination of factors, including reduced remuneration 
for excess reserves (from 2.07% to 0.72%), introduction of online settlement technology, 
advances in the Chinese bond and money markets that the enable better liquidity man-
agement, and stronger profit motives on the part of Chinese banks following public list-
ing. 
Two recent monetary policy cycles illustrate the varying roles of offsetting op-
erations and initial excess reserves in conditioning the impact of RRR changes. In the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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first tightening cycle, from 2007 to mid 2008, the PBC absorbed liquidity through both an 
800-bps advance in the RRR and aggressive PBC bill auctions, in response to large-scale 
FX interventions (Graph 10, left-hand panel). However, as a partial offset, the excess re-
serves/deposits ratio declined by more than 100 bps in the same period, to 2%. Increased 
reserve requirements combined with aggressive PBC bill issuance and official interest 
rate hikes to slow loan growth. In this cycle, the PBC actively sold its bills in sterilisation 
operations but had already begun to shift towards greater reliance on reserve requir e-
ments.  
By contrast, during the second tightening cycle, the PBC raised the RRR by a to-
tal of 600 bps between 2010 and June 2011, while letting more of its bills to run off. In 
this episode, the excess reserves/deposits ratio declined by less than 80 bps, from 1.6% to 
0.8%. As excess reserves approached a threshold of about 1% of bank deposits, a given 
RRR hike tended to become more biting than otherwise. On the other hand, offsetting 
PBC operations were substantial, as more of the maturing PBC bills were allowed to run 
off. The PBC bills outstanding fell more than 40% by mid 2011, from its peak in mid 
2010. The impact of RRR hikes was strengthened by the initially lower excess reserves 
but dampened by the runoff of PBC bills outstanding in this cycle. 
Thus, diminishing initial excess reserves, interest rate hikes, and increasing re-
serve requirements (despite some policy offsets) combined to restrain the banks’ capacity 
to expand credit. During these two episodes of rising RRR, the Chinese loan growth did 
slow significantly. Indeed, the initial level of excess reserves may have become a binding 
factor in the expansion of overall bank assets in the subsequent quarter (Graph 10, right-
hand panel).  
Nevertheless, caution is required in attempting to disentangle the impact of RRR 
changes from the potential effects of other policy tools, such as indicative loan quota, 
window guidance and loan-to-deposit ratios. For instance, a more rigorous implementa-
tion of the 75% loan-to-deposit ratio on a daily-average, rather than monthly-end, basis 
may force some Chinese banks to maintain a larger deposit base on average, potentially 
making a given RRR hike more biting than otherwise. 
 
 
 Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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4.3  Effects on money supply 
 
We also explore the role of reserve requirements in monetary control (Borio, 1997) by 
estimating the effects of RRR variations on the money multiplier, in textbook fashion 
(Liu et al, 2011). This approach has its own flaws but is useful in the Chinese context, 
since the PBC is sometimes perceived to have limited control over its own balance sheet, 
due to the constraint of heavy FX interventions, and often has resorted to reserve re-
quirements in an attempt to achieve its M2 target, which remains the official intermediate 
target for the PBC.  
Large and frequent changes in the RRR in China can be a major factor influenc-
ing the multiplier, which is a function of both the excess reserves/deposits ratio and the 
RRR. While excess reserves are maintained by banks for settlement purposes and are a 
function of payment uncertainties, costs of liquidity, and payment infrastructure (Borio, 
1997; Disyatat, 2008), the PBC sets the RRR so as to hit the M2 growth target by influ-
encing the multiplier.  
Liu et al, (2011) conduct a simple scenario analysis to gauge the likely effect of 
RRR changes on broad money growth in China, taking reserve money as given. Accord-
ing to  their vector auto-regression (VAR) estimates,  a 100-bps  RRR  hike lowers the 
money multiplier by 0.075 on average (See Appendix B for details). Table 1 compares 
the actual multiplier and M2 growth with its simulated values without RRR changes in a 
given year. For instance, without the 300 bps RRR rise in 2010, M2 growth based on 
their VAR estimation would have reached 27%, much higher than the observed 20%. 
This scenario analysis also suggests that should reserve money grow by 26% in 2011, 
which is a reasonable assumption, the RRR would need to increase by 400 bps in order to 
deliver the official M2 growth target of 16% at the end of 2011.
12 
 
4.4  Funding costs and loan-deposit rate spreads 
 
There are at least two ways for RRR hikes to translate into higher borrowing costs for 
business and households, thus tightening domestic monetary conditions. First, without 
sufficient offsetting actions, raising the RRR may force banks to adjust their balance 
sheets over time, more so as excess reserves move closer to some minimum threshold. In BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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response, commercial banks tap the interbank money market more and sell some of their 
bond holdings, resulting in higher bond yields and/or higher money-market interest rates 
in the context of China’s two-track interest rate environment (Yi, 2009; Chen et al, 2011; 
He and Wang, 2011). Higher market interest rates would in turn prompt banks to charge 
borrowers more at the margin. Alternatively, required reserves remunerated at rates be-
low interbank rates tax intermediation and thus directly raise the cost of credit within the 
banking system, assuming some degree of cost pass-through. 
This seems to be the case in both the tightening cycles of 2007-08 and 2010-11, 
when interbank funding costs rose. Firstly, as the PBC continued raising the RRR and 
excess reserves narrowed, due to less than full offsetting operations, the 7-day repo rate 
and 3-month PBC bill yield became more volatile and generally rose, though with a lag 
(Graph 11). However, the relationship between excess reserves and short rates has been 
erratic, as argued by Disyatat (2008). This could in part relate to uncertainties about the 
expected course of other future policy actions through the signalling channel. Further, 
concurrent hikes in bank interest rates also directly contributed to higher short-term mar-
ket rates.  
Alternatively,  without  directly  appealing  to  a  two-track  interest  rate  setting, 
banks are motivated to transfer the cost imposed by reserve requirements via attempts to 
either pay depositors less or charge borrowers more or both — by widening the loan-
deposit rate spread (Montoro and Moreno, 2011). This rests on the implicit assumption 
that the burden can be passed through. If so, financial conditions may be tightened by ad-
vancing reserve requirements. As discussed, Chinese commercial banks within the con-
straints of minimum loan-deposit rate spreads still have leeway in pricing loans and de-
posits to widen their spreads between lending and deposit rates beyond the regulated 
minimum spread.  
If the deposit rate cap were binding in China, higher bank lending rates would be 
required to support the conjecture that banks managed to pass through some of the RRR 
cost, so as to tighten domestic monetary conditions. The rising RRR did seem to prompt 
term lending rates to rise. For instance, the yield on 6-month discounted bills rose no-
ticeably relative to the official floor lending rate, in response to a rising RRR that man-
aged to squeeze excess reserves (Graph 12, left-hand panel). The gyrating rate spread be-
                                                                                                                                                   
12 By June 2011, the PBC had hiked the RRR by 300 bps. In September 2011, the PBC widened the reserv-
able deposit base in a phased manner, with an estimated effect equivalent to an RRR hike of 125 bps.  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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tween bills and bank loans reached as much as 500 bps in the last two tightening cycles. 
More importantly, a higher portion of the new loans is priced by Chinese banks above the 
official floor lending rate when the rising RRR squeezes excess reserves, pushing funding 
costs higher (Graph 12, right-hand panel).
13 
Chinese banks also appeared to have widened their net interest margin and net 
interest spread during the recent two cycles, tightening domestic financial conditions by 
passing some of the reserve requirement cost to bank customers (Graph 13, left -hand 
panel). Conceivably, the observed wider interest margins and spreads were mainly a r e-
sult of asymmetric adjustments in official loan and deposit rates by the Chinese gover n-
ment to compensate Chinese banks for the increased RRR tax burden, especially given its 
tendency to hike the RRR and bank interest rates one after another. Nevertheless, the 
margins and spreads widened during the first three quarters of 2010 when the PBC hiked 
the RRR three times by 150 bps without hiking any bank rates (Graph 13, right -hand 
panel). Therefore, other things equal, wider net interest margins and spreads point to at 
least some pass-through, serving to tighten local financial conditions. However, other fac-
tors may also influence the observed net interest margins, as will be discussed in the next 
section.
14  
In any case, an interesting question remains what will happen to bank profitabil-
ity in China if the official protection of loan-deposit rate spread and reserve requirements 
are both eased or abandoned. We doubt that any margin s queeze would be dramatic, as 
China’s net interest margin seems neither excessively wide nor narrow, either relative to 
its international peers or over its own recent cycles (left-hand panel of Graph 14 and Ta-
ble 2). If anything, China’s net interest margin is much closer to Australia’s, where there 





                                                 
13 During the recent phase of RRR hiking, interest rates were reported to jump sharply in the Chinese grey 
credit market, where small private and family businesses often borrow, a debtor database is lacking, and 
any RRR spillovers into interest rates are likely to be non-linear, given the slower aggregate credit expan-
sion. 
14 These factors in general include changes in inflation trends, market competition, the composition of bank 
deposits and loans, the bank yield curve as well as underlying asset riskiness.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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5  Tax burden and other side-effects  
 
Whatever its perceived advantages, heavy and sustained reliance on reserve requirements 
may carry costs and complications (Borio, 1997; Shu, et al, 2008; Montoro and Moreno, 
2011). If required reserves are remunerated at a rate below returns to alternative invest-
ments, they impose a direct distortionary tax on financial intermediation. This could put 
depository institutions at a disadvantage and often imply more costly credit to borrowers 
and/or lower returns to depositors than otherwise. Excess application of reserve require-
ments could also give rise to regulatory arbitrage, potentially complicating monetary and 
financial stability.  
How big is the tax burden on the Chinese banking sector? Who pays it: banks’ 
shareholders, borrowers or depositors? Finally, can banks avoid these costs by sponsoring 
disintermediation?  
 
5.1  The size of the reserve requirement tax 
 
The implicit tax burden associated with reserve requirements depends on two sets of fac-
tors. First, it hinges on whether required reserves are fully remunerated at the opportunity 
cost. If so, reserve requirements incur no tax, at least not directly. A levy is imposed on 
banks when the remuneration less than the returns on alternative investments. However, 
what is opportunity cost is a tricky question in the context of China’s two-track interest 
rate regime. For international comparison purposes, this paper benchmarks the opportu-
nity cost at both one- and five-year ―risk-free‖ domestic government bond yields. The 
difference between the opportunity cost and the remuneration on required reserves is the 
implicit average ―tax rate‖. 
The second factor is the ―tax base‖, i.e. the required reserves, which depend on 
the scale of the banking sector, the coverage of the reservable deposits within the banking 
sector, and the level of the RRR. A larger banking sector, wider coverage of deposits un-
der reserve requirements and higher average RRR all broaden the ―tax base‖. The tax 
burden of reserve requirements, therefore, is the product of the tax rate and base.  
An  international  comparison  would  help  place  our  estimates  in  perspective. 
China’s tax base is unmistakably among the largest globally, owing to its large banking 
sector, broad deposit coverage and high RRR (Table 3 and Graph 2). Yet scaled by either Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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GDP or domestic private credit, China’s implicit RRR tax burden is manageable (at 0.3% 
of GDP in 2010) and is located in the middle of our international comparison. It is lighter 
than those in Colombia and India but heavier than those in Korea, Malaysia or Russia.
15 
The main reason is China’s low interest rates (government bond yields) compared to most 
emerging market peers.
16  
China’s RRR-implied tax burden has also evolved in recent years (Table 4). Its 
required reserves are currently remunerated at 1.62%, down from the 2008 level of 1.89% 
and  below  the  prevailing  one-year  and  five-year  government  bond  yields  of  2%  and 
2.8%, respectively. The overall tax burden is estimated to have first more than halved be-
tween 2004 and 2006, as a modest rise in the tax base was overwhelmed by a marked de-
cline in government bond yields. It however has since rebounded strongly, more than tri-
pling between 2006 and 2010, due to a big expansion of the tax base following a rapid 
deposit growth and a doubling of the RRR from 9.5% to 18%, in addition to the reduced 
remuneration. More than 80% of the rise in the implied tax burden during this phase 
came from a larger tax base.  
A manageable tax burden now should not give rise to complacency. With the 
prospects of a higher RRR and a still brisk inflation trend in 2011 (and potentially higher 
interest rates), China’s RRR-implied tax burden may not lighten much in the near term. 
Also, in theory, a rise in Chinese interest rates to about half of its 2010 nominal GDP 
growth rate of 15% from an average of 3% in 2010 would imply as much as a five-fold 
rise in the tax burden from the estimated 2010 level to a much more substantial 1.8% of 
GDP.
17 Finally, an expansion of the reservable deposit base could also lead to an add i-




                                                 
15 It is comparable to an estimated average of 0.25% for the G10 economies in the 1980s (Borio, 1997). The 
Eurosystem designed its required reserves not to impose a tax and its remuneration was set at the level of 
the ECB’s main refinancing rate (currently 1.5%) which under normal circumstances is equal to overnight 
interbank rates. If the overnight rate is taken as the opportunity cost, China’s reserve requirement tax bur-
den in 2010 would fall to around 0.1% of GDP.  
16 Key reasons for low interest rates in China include relatively low inflation and high saving rate (Ma and 
Wang, 2010). Some, in contrast, claim that low Chinese interest rates are a consequence of ―financial re-
pression‖ that in turn contributes to a higher Chinese saving rate.  
17 He and Wang (2011) take the saving rate into consideration and still come up with an equilibrium deposit 
rate three times the actual level in 2005.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
 
 
  27 
5.2  Tax incidence 
 
Bank shareholders and depositors, and smaller firms could all bear the overall RRR tax 
burden and ultimately share the sterilisation cost of FX intervention. At one extreme, a 
hike in the RRR tends to squeeze net interest margins by an amount similar to its mar-
ginal tax on the whole reservable deposit base, if there is zero pass-through of the tax 
burden to bank customers. In this extreme case, the bank shareholders pay. However, 
wider margins under increased reserve requirements may indicate meaningful cost pass-
through to bank customers, other things equal. In the limit, bank depositors and borrow-
ers would pay (Montoro and Moreno, 2011). In between, the distribution of the tax bur-
den can be influenced by a host of factors. We first present evidence that at margin, a sig-
nificant portion of this quasi-fiscal cost may have fallen on bank customers. However, it 
is possible that the wider net interest margins reflect higher riskiness of underlying bank 
assets, leaving this evidence consistent with bank shareholders sharing in the cost.  
Two sets of evidence point to meaningful cost pass-through to bank customers. 
First, bank earnings were quite strong during the two RRR-hiking cycles in 2006-2010 
when the immediate tax burden on banks tripled. Indeed, their aggregate after-tax profits 
recorded an average annual compound growth rate of more than 30% in this episode of 
mostly rising RRR (Graph 14, right-hand panel). The average return on equity for Chi-
nese banks has also trended higher in recent years, confirming higher bank profitability, 
despite a substantially higher RRR.  
Second, wider net interest margins and spreads may in part indicate banks’ abil-
ity to pass some of the burden onto their customers. As discussed earlier, Chinese banks 
managed to widen their net interest margin and spread by some 10 bps during the first 
three quarters of 2010 when the PBC raised the RRR by 150 bps without a single change 
in the regulated deposit and lending interest rates (Graph 13). Other things equal, this 
would support the conjecture that banks pass on some of the cost to their customers.  
Two questions arise here. First, assuming 100% cost pass-through to bank cus-
tomers, what is the likely distribution between depositors and borrowers? Second, could 
the observed margin expansions reflect something else if other things do not remain the 
same and bank shareholders could end up bearing some of the tax burden? The earning 
announcements of twelve listed Chinese banks, which account for 60% of China’s loan 
and deposit markets, may help shed light on these two questions (Table 5).  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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As to the first question, we contend that at least an important part of the RRR 
cost is passed on to depositors. During 2010, the average net interest spread for these 
listed banks widened by 26 bps, in tandem with a 300-bps rise in the RRR. This is a com-
bined consequence of a 20-bps decline in the average deposit rate and a 7-bps rise in the 
average lending rate, suggesting that three quarters of the margin expansion derived from 
a lower average interest cost on deposit rather than from higher charges on borrowers. 
Indeed, the average interest cost of deposits fell across all twelve reporting banks, even as 
the ceiling for the one-year deposit rate, often viewed as binding, was raised by 50 bps in 
final quarter of 2010.
18  
Regarding the second question, we believe that the wider net interest margins 
may in part reflect increased risk premia rather than complete cost pass -through per se. 
We note that only half of these listed banks managed to charge their borrowers more dur-
ing 2010, despite ample incentive and leeway to do so  and a hike of 50 bps in the f loor 
lending rate in the fourth quarter. Interestingly, all big four Chinese banks failed to 
charge their borrowers more, and two of them actually experienced margin compression. 
One likely reason for this is the weaker pricing power of the four big banks over their top 
borrowers — big state companies with better access to cheaper bond and money-market 
financing. Indeed, the issuance of corporate bills, notes and bonds has accelerated in re-
cent years, and banks themselves are major holders of corporate paper (Graph 15). 
If so, the slight rise in the average lending rate in 2010 may indicate more of a 
shift to direct financing, in order to bypass the regulated floor lending rate. As more blue 
chip companies tap the corporate debt market directly, a bigger portion of the bank loan 
portfolio goes to smaller firms. Indeed, loans to SMEs, as a share of total bank loans, 
have risen from 50% at the end of 2008 to 60% in June 2011 (Graph 16, left-hand panel). 
Hence the observed higher loan rate charged by banks may in part reflect higher risk 
premia, as banks move down the credit spectrum. If so, the risk-adjusted net interest rate 
spread may not widen or could even narrow. With the implied cost pass-through incom-
plete, bank shareholders can meaningfully share the cost imposed by reserve require-
                                                 
18 The decline in the average interest cost on deposits in 2010 may have less to do with banks’ ability to 
reduce headline interest rates on deposits and more to do with two other factors. First, the maturity compo-
sition of deposits shortens as inflation rises, owing to lags in deposit rate hikes. Second, some interest ex-
penses could be included in other bank expense categories to circumvent the official ceiling on deposit 
rates.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ments, thus qualifying any (Montoro-Moreno) tightening effects of increased reserve re-
quirements.  
Improved access by SMEs to the formal banking sector is often both welfare and 
efficiency enhancing. The rub is that it also means a given RRR hike would hurt small 
firms more, forcing them to shoulder disproportionally any given burden of pass-through 
to corporate borrowers, because of the greater dependence of small businesses on costlier 
bank credit.  
More generally, changes in  asset composition affect overall riskiness and thus 
can influence  the observed  net interest margins and spreads. For ins tance, mortgage 
loans, which carry a lower risk weight, have risen as a share of total loans in China, from 
1% in 1997 to 13% in 2010, offsetting the increased riskiness of bank assets due to more 
lending to small firms. Moreover, expansion of required reserves held at the PBC and 
diminishing PBC bills outstanding, both zero risk -weighted, may offset each other in 
terms of their effects on bank asset riskiness. Overall, recent years have witnessed a rise 
in the riskiness of bank assets in China, as the ratio of the risk -weighted to unweighted 
bank assets rose notably (Graph 16, right-hand panel). Therefore, it is still too early to 
ascertain whether risk-adjusted margins and spreads have widened, before the full credit 
cycle is played out.  
 
5.3   Regulatory arbitrage and disintermediation 
 
Heavy reserve requirements may bring about distortions that encourage regulatory arbi-
trage and influence funding strategies of Chinese banks. According to Goodhart’s Law, 
the information content of an indicator tends to diminish after it is becomes a policy tar-
get, because of the incentive to circumvent it. For instance, banks could more actively use 
non-reservable funding instruments such as bond issuance and wealth management prod-
ucts. In the first half of 2011, bonds issued by Chinese banks accounted for more than 
10% of the increase in the total bank funding, compared to less than 4% in the same pe-
riod of 2010. Most of the bond issuance during this period appears to be unrelated to 
capital requirements and might have more to do with avoidance of increased reserve re-
quirements.  
Moreover, in response to a combination of rising RRR, indicative loan quota and 
stricter enforcement of the loan/deposit ratio, banks have increased their off-balance sheet Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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lending while attracting more margin deposits (deposits used as collateral for bankers’ 
acceptances and letters of credit), which helped meet the loan/deposit ratio cap but were 
non-reservable before September 2011. As a result, the flows of off-balance sheet credit 
provision (trust loans, entrusted loans and bank acceptance bills) expanded to 50% of 
new bank loans in the first half of 2011 from 20% in 2008. Meanwhile, margin deposits 
grew faster than the reservable deposits: the former rose 33% in 2010 and 27% in the first 
half of 2011, compared to 20% and 7% for the latter.  
Finally, heavy reserve requirements may have negative implications for mone-
tary and financial stability. Firstly, a rapidly rising RRR appeared to have added to the 
recent higher volatility of money market interest rates (Graph 11, right-hand panel). Sec-
ondly, a higher RRR burden on Chinese banks may contribute to the ongoing disinterme-
diation, in part because of more costly bank credit and lower returns on deposits (Graph 
15). Disorderly disintermediation driven primarily by regulatory  arbitrage could  chal-
lenge policymakers struggling to reach a balance between financial liberalisation and sta-
bility, as the Korean experience in the 1990s has shown (Cho and McCauley, 2003).  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Looking ahead, how much higher would the PBC be able to push the RRR in the medium 
term? As of June 2011, China’s 21% RRR is already quite high, both historically and in 
terms of international standards. The medium-term outlook for the potential use of re-
serve requirements will depend on a number of factors, the most important being the 
scale of foreign exchange interventions funded by the PBC balance sheet, which in turn is 
influenced by China’s external surpluses, its exchange rate management policy and effec-
tiveness of capital controls. Should the balance of payments surplus decline, the PBC 
may lean less heavily on or even cut reserve requirements. 
Another consideration is the relative roles of various sterilisation instruments, 
for a given sterilisation task. The outstanding amount of PBC bills had already fallen 40% 
by June 2011 from the June 2010 peak. As open market operation tools (such as repos 
and PBC bills) are generally more flexible, entail less distortions and can sometimes be 
used to signal policy rate changes, the PBC may wish to retain a reasonable level of bills BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
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outstanding and thus rebalance the mix of various sterilisation tools available in its arse-
nal (Mehrotra, 2011). 
Third, prospective reserve requirements also hinge on the process of China’s fi-
nancial market  development and the evolution of its  monetary policy framework.  In-
creased reserve requirements add costs to financial intermediation. On the other hand, 
faster interest rate liberalisation and greater exchange rate flexibility would foster finan-
cial market development and a move towards a more interest rate-oriented monetary pol-
icy framework, likely reducing the reliance on reserve requirements.  
Finally, the outlook for higher reserve requirements may also relate to policy 
stances in major economies. Given the prospects of an extremely easy policy stance in 
most major economies for an extended period of time, the possibility of a continued pref-
erence for this sterilisation tool should not be discounted.
19 But as the first RRR cut in 
three years suggests,  China’s tightening cycle may be turning in December 2011. 
In sum, this paper examines the role of reserve requirements in absorbing struc-
tural liquidity surpluses arising from FX interventions and in tightening monetary condi-
tions in China. This policy tool has been more actively used as a cheaper substitute for 
open market operations and has become more complex over time. Given the sterilisation 
task and toolkit mix, higher reserve requirements seem to help to constrain bank lending 
by squeezing excess reserves, lowering the money multiplier, pushing market interest 
rates higher and inducing commercial banks to widen net interest spreads. The distortion-
ary tax burden imposed by reserve requirements on Chinese banks (0.3% of GDP) is 
manageable, owing to a confluence of high required reserves and low market interest 
rates. Chinese banks appear to have passed on a large part (but probably not all) of these 






                                                 
19 The optimal RRR has also been explored in the context of tax revenue maximisation by Zhang, et al 
(2008). The idea is akin to that of the Laffer curve, wherein when the tax rate rises above some threshold, 
the tax base may shrink enough to result in a fall in total tax revenues. Zhang et al (2008) estimates the 
RRR that maximises tax revenue at around 23% in China.  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
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Appendix A  Granger tests 
 
We have conducted simple Granger causality tests of two null hypotheses: (i) reserve 
money growth does NOT Granger cause loan growth (H1); and (ii) loan growth does NOT 
Granger cause reserve  money  growth  (H2). Our regressions  employ both  measures  of 
RRR-adjusted  reserve  money  from  Equations  (1)  and  (2),  local  and  foreign  currency 
loans, and lags of 3, 6 and 12 months.  The following two tables summarise the statistical 
results.  
 
A1  Granger causality tests of growth in local currency loans and RRR-adjusted reserve money1 
  RRR-adjusted reserve money (Equation 1)  RRR-adjusted reserve money (Equation 2) 
3-month lag 
H1:   3.459  (0.019)**  H1:   3.196  (0.026)** 
H2:  0.677  (0.568)  H2:  0.542  (0.655) 
6-month lag 
H1:   2.906  (0.012)**  H1:   2.894  (0.012)** 
H2:  0.337  (0.916)  H2:  0.154  (0.988) 
12-month lag 
H1:   1.694  (0.082)*  H1:   1.578  (0.113) 
H2:  1.007  (0.449)  H2:  1.351  (0.205) 
 
1  The sample covers March 2001 and July 2011. Growth is defined as year-on-year percentage change in 3-
month moving average of levels. H1 is the null hypothesis that reserve money growth does NOT Granger 
cause loan growth; H2 is the null hypothesis that loan growth does NOT Granger cause reserve money 
growth. The numbers are F-statistics and p-values in parentheses, where ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Sources: CEIC; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
A2  Granger causality tests of growth in local and foreign currency loans and  
  RRR-adjusted reserve money1 
  RRR-adjusted reserve money  (Equation 1)  RRR-adjusted reserve money (Equation 2) 
3-month lag 
H1:   7.502  (0.000)***  H1:   5.583  (0.002)*** 
H2:  0.553  (0.647)  H2:  0.542  (0.655) 
6-month lag 
H1:   4.287  (0.001)***  H1:   4.006  (0.002)*** 
H2:  0.758  (0.605)  H2:  0.503  (0.804) 
12-month lag 
H1:   2.664  (0.007)***  H1:   2.169  (0.027)** 
H2:  1.659  (0.104)  H2:  1.589  (0.124) 
 
1  The sample covers February 2004 and July 2011. Growth is defined as the year-on-year percentage change 
in 3-month moving average of levels. H1 is the null hypothesis that reserve money growth does NOT Granger 
cause loan growth; H2 is the null hypothesis that loan growth does NOT Granger cause reserve money 
growth. The numbers are F-statistics and p-values in parentheses, where ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Sources: CEIC; authors’ calculations. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Appendix B  VAR estimations of RRR impact on  
    money multiplier 
 
A vector auto-regression (VAR) model is employed to estimate the impact of a change in 








 ;     ERR RRR R    
where RRR is the reserve requirement ratio, ERR is the ratio of excess reserves to depos-
its and CU is the ratio of currency in circulation to deposits. RRR is a policy variable; CU 
and ERR may, in our simplified model, be functions of the overnight China interbank 
lending rate (CHIBOR), which by itself is endogenous. Thus, our model consists of three 
equations, for MM, CU and CHIBOR, and RRR is the exogenous variable in all three. 
The sample comprises monthly data from March 2000 to December 2010. To remove 
seasonality, we take the 12-month first-order differences for all the variables.  
The  VAR  estimation  results  are  summarised  in  Table  B1.  According  to  the 
Schwarz criterion, the lag order is 1. The VAR stability condition check shows that no 
root lies outside the unit circle, indicating that the VAR model satisfies the stability con-
dition. RRR is confirmed as exogenous to MM, CU and CHIBOR. The F-statistics and 
Akaike information criterion statistics for both the whole VAR model and for the MM 
equation are satisfactory. The estimated RRR coefficient in the MM equation indicates 
that a rise of 100 bps in the RRR reduces the money multiplier (MM) by 0.075. The esti-
mated RRR coefficient in the CHIBOR equation also indicates that a 100-bps RRR hike 
raises CHIBOR by 27 bps, confirming the finding by He and Wang (2011) about spill-
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Table B1  Vector auto-regression estimation of three-equation system 
  (1) MM  (2) CU  (3) CHIBOR 
RRR  –0.075  (–5.558)***  0.056  (1.319)*  0.271  (7.751)*** 
C  0.146  (6.130)***  –0.605  (–7.979)***  –0.359  (–5.823)*** 
MM-1  0.642  (9.751)***  –0.064  (–0.305)  1.199  (7.028)*** 
CU-1  0.106  (3.211)***  –0.045  (–0.429)  -0.003  (-0.040) 
CHIBOR-1  –0.023  (–1.016)  0.124  (1.692)**  0.639  (10.756)*** 
       
F-statistic  234.304***  5.681***  94.593*** 
AIC  –1.262  1.057  0.643 
SC  –1.144  1.175  0.761 
R-squared  0.893  0.169  0.772 
No of obs  117 after 12-month first differencing 
1.  The sample covers March 2000 and December 2010. MM is the money multiplier, CU the ratio of currency 
in circulation to deposits, CHIBOR the overnight China interbank offered rate. All variables are seasonally ad-
justed by 12-month first-order differencing.  
2.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, where ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. AIC indicates Akaike information criterion statistics, and SC Schwarz criterion statistics. 
3. For the three-equation system of this model as a whole, AIC = 0.014 and SC = 0.368. 
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Box 1  China’s evolving reserve requirement system 
Currently, China’s reserve requirement regime features lagged accounting, with a 10-day maintenance period 
but without averaging. All deposit-taking institutions and most of their deposits are included in the system but 
are subject to different requirements. It is essentially a two-tier reserve requirement system, with a benchmark 
reserve requirement ratio (applied to a few large commercial banks) amounting to 21.5% as of June 2011, 200 
bps higher than that applied to most other smaller deposit-taking institutions. In addition, the RRR for rural and 
urban credit cooperatives currently ranges from 500 to 600 bps lower than that for the large banks. All required 
reserves must be held as deposits at the PBC but can be used for intra-day settlements. Both the required and 
excess reserves are remunerated at rates set by the PBC. Foreign currency deposits are subject to a lower 
reserve requirement (currently 5%) but unremunerated.  
China’s reserve requirement system was first established in 1984 when the nation tried to rebuild its modern 
banking system. Before 1998, required reserves could not be used for settlement and a separate, mandatory 
minimum settlement reserves ratio was set by the PBC. Then reserve requirements differed according to the 
bank and type of deposit (corporate deposit, saving deposit or demand deposit). During this episode, the cen-
tral function of reserve requirements was neither monetary nor prudential but rather aimed mainly at facilitating 
government credit policy, allowing the PBC to allocate financial resources to priority sectors specified by the 
government, as the PBC lending to commercial banks often far exceeded the required reserves deposited at 
the PBC in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Table  Reserve requirements in China 
Period  RRR  Remarks 
1984 – 1985  20% - 40%  Depending on type of deposit 
1985 – 1987  10%  Unified RRR for all reservable deposits 
1987 – 1988  10% to 13%   Two increments to fight rising inflation 
1988 – 1998  13%  Additional minimum clearing reserves 
1998  8%  One cut to unify RRR for all banks while 
making excess reserves voluntary 
1999 – 2003  6%  One cut to fight deflation 
2003 – 2006  6% to 9%  5 increments 
2007 – Aug 2008  9% to 17.5%  16 increments and differentiated RRRs  
2008  Large banks  Small banks  A formal two-tier RRR system established 
Sept 2008 – Dec 2008  17.5% to 15.5%  17.5% to 13.5%  3 cuts and two-tier RRRs for large and 
smaller banks to inject liquidity 
2009  15.5%  13.5%  No change in RRR 
Jan 2010 – June 2011  15.5% to 21.5%  13.5% to 19.5%  12 increments, selective RRR hikes and 
dynamic differentiated RRR 
 
Source: PBC and CEIC.  
The current Chinese system has evolved from the basic 1998 setup, with three distinct trends. First, the official 
remuneration rates on both required and excess reserves have been lowered considerably, from the high lev-
els of 7% to 8% in the late 1990s to less 2% lately, and typically serve as a floor for the overnight interbank 
rate. Second, since 2007, as excess reserves have declined considerably, more active use has been made of 
reserve requirements as a major liquidity withdrawal instrument. Third, the reserve requirement system has 
become  more  sophisticated  and  differentiated  across  banks.  The  differentiation  was  initially  related  to  the 
bank’s capital adequacy or asset quality on a one-off basis in the mid 2000s but since early 2011 has been 
linked to a bank’s systemic importance, prudential indicators and loan growth relative to the aggregate trend on 
a dynamic basis. The PBC seems to be moving to a mix of liability- and asset-based reserve requirements of 
its own discretion, with the benchmark RRR based on the liability side (deposits) and the individual differentials 
linked to the asset side (loans) on a monthly or quarterly basis (BoK, 2010). Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi 
 




  38 
Tables 
 
Table 1  Monetary growth and multiplier: actual and simulated 
  Actual  Simulated without RRR hikes 
  Growth of reserve 
money
1 
Multiplier  Growth of M2
1  RRR hikes
2  Multiplier
3  Growth of M2
1, 3 
2000  8.5  3.79  15.4  0.0  3.79  15.4 
2001  9.2  3.97  14.4  0.0  3.97  14.4 
2002  13.3  4.10  16.9  0.0  4.10  16.9 
2003  17.1  4.19  19.6  10  4.26  21.7 
2004  11.4  4.32  14.9  50  4.35  15.9 
2005  9.3  4.59  16.3  0.0  4.59  16.3 
2006  20.9  4.44  17.0  150  4.55  19.8 
2007  30.6  3.97  16.7  550  4.38  28.8 
2008  27.3  3.68  17.8  50  3.72  19.1 
2009  11.4  4.21  27.6  0.0  4.21  27.6 
2010  28.7  3.92  19.7  300  4.15  26.7 
Memo             
2011
4  25.5  3.62  16.0  400  3.92  25.6 
 
1 Year-on-year growth.     
2 In basis points.    
3 Computed using our VAR estimate that a rise of 100 bps in the RRR reduces the multiplier by 0.075 in the 
same year (see Appendix B for details).  
4 Estimated on assumption that in 2011 reserve money grows at 25.5%, official M2 target is 16%, with no 
RRR change, the multiplier is the same as in 2010.   
Sources: PBC, authors’ own estimates.  





Table 2  Net interest margins of listed banks in Asia and the Pacific 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Australia  2.53  2.38  2.28  2.24  2.13  2.09  2.20  2.23 
China  2.58  2.53  2.58  2.56  2.92  3.02  2.28  2.44 
Hong Kong SAR  2.02  1.82  1.83  1.94  2.03  2.05  1.80  1.65 
India  3.14  3.15  2.98  3.00  2.83  2.85  2.73  3.09 
Indonesia  4.75  6.07  6.07  6.28  6.31  6.47  6.34  6.36 
Korea  3.28  3.34  3.17  2.94  2.93  2.76  2.66  2.82 
Malaysia  3.12  2.97  2.79  2.72  2.68  2.63  2.74  2.79 
Pakistan  3.52  3.35  5.48  6.63  6.44  6.39  6.55  6.23 
Philippines  3.33  3.54  4.17  4.14  3.64  3.47  3.86  3.62 
Singapore  1.95  1.95  1.92  2.08  2.11  2.17  2.18  1.94 
Taiwan  1.92  1.82  1.47  1.67  1.46  1.41  0.97  1.07 
Thailand  2.20  2.74  3.17  3.40  3.42  3.62  2.97  3.10 
 
Note: in per cent; listed banks under coverage of Credit Suisse.  
Source: Credit Suisse estimates. 
   
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/ 2011 
 
 
  39 
Table 3  Reserve requirement and implicit tax in selected economies1 
  CN  CO  IN
7  KR  MY  RU 
(1) Required reserves ratio, %             
On local currency  11 – 17  0 – 11
2  6  0 – 7  1  2.5 
On foreign currency  5  -  5.5  1 – 7  -  2.5 
             
(2) Required reserves as % of             
GDP
3  25.42  2.77  4.18  2.98  0.94  0.87 
Credit to private sector  19.92  8.52  8.59  2.93  0.83  2.08 
             
(3) Opportunity cost
4 (in basis pts)             
Based on yield on 1-year gov notes  47  353  651  313  290  471 
Based on yield on 5-year gov bonds  102  683  768  400  337  681 
             
(4) Implicit tax. %
5             
Based on yield on 1-year gov notes             
    share of GDP
3  0.12  0.12  0.27  0.09  0.03  0.04 
    share of credit to private sector  0.09  0.30  0.56  0.09  0.02  0.10 
Based on yield on 5-year gov bonds             
    share of GDP
3  0.26  0.20  0.32  0.12  0.03  0.06 
    share of credit to private sector  0.20  0.58  0.66  0.12  0.03  0.14 
             
 
CN = China; CO = Colombia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia. 
1  As of August 2010 unless specified.   
2  As of December 2010.  
3  Provisional data for 2010.  
4  Spread between government bond yield at specified maturity and required reserve remuneration.  
5  Product of required reserves and opportunity cost: (4) = (2)*(3).   
6  As of Jun 2010.  
7 India’s cash reserve ratio only, not including statutory liquidity ratio.  
 




Table 4  Implicit tax burden of reserve requirements in China, %1 
             Year  GDP  Central bank total assets  Credit to private sector  Fiscal revenue 
2004  0.22  0.45  0.18  1.33 
2005  0.13  0.23  0.11  0.74 
2006  0.08  0.13  0.07  0.42 
2007  0.26  0.40  0.24  1.29 
2008  0.37  0.56  0.36  1.88 
2009  0.25  0.37  0.19  1.24 
2010  0.35  0.54  0.27  1.68 
 
1  Burden is the required reserve amount outstanding at year-end times the annual opportunity cost associated 
with holding RRR. Opportunity cost is the difference between full-year average 5-year government bond 
yield and full-year average remuneration rate on required reserves.  
 
Sources: PBC, CEIC, IFS and authors’ own estimates. 
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Table 5  Loan and deposit rates and net interest spread in China, % 
  Average deposit rate  Average loan rate  Loan-deposit rate spread 
2009  2010  2009  2010  2009  2010 
ICBC  1.68  1.35  5.21  4.99  3.53  3.64 
CCB  1.51  1.28  5.37  5.07  3.86  3.79 
BOC  1.44  1.28  4.44  4.22  3.00  2.94 
ABC  1.49  1.25  5.25  5.22  3.76  3.97 
BoCom  1.57  1.42  5.13  5.13  3.56  3.71 
China Merchant  1.44  1.24  4.49  4.87  3.05  3.63 
Citic  1.50  1.33  4.78  5.00  3.28  3.67 
Pudong Development  1.61  1.43  5.34  5.34  3.73  3.91 
Minsheng  1.66  1.53  5.31  5.79  3.65  4.26 
Industrial  1.56  1.46  5.39  5.36  3.83  3.90 
Huaxia  1.57  1.38  4.82  5.50  3.25  4.12 
Shenzhen Development  1.69  1.53  5.46  5.33  3.77  3.80 
memo             
Simple average  1.56  1.37  5.08  5.15  3.52  3.78 
 
Note: ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; CCB = China Construction Bank; BOC = Bank of 
China; ABC = Agriculture Bank of China; BoCom = Bank of Communication.  
Sources: earnings announcements of listed banks, authors’ own estimates.  
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Graphs 
 
Graph 1  Reserve requirement ratios in China and selected emerging markets. % 
 
Reserve requirement ratio in China






BR = Brazil; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; PE = Peru; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey. 
 
1  Average RRR for large and small banks.     
2  End-2009 to end-2010. 
 
 





Graph 2  Required and excess reserves in selected economies, %1 
 





1  As of August 2010.    
2  Difference between total reserves and required reserves. For Thailand, excess reserves may include other 
short-dated instruments.  
 
Source: National data; BIS central bank questionnaires. 
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Graph 3   Sterilisation tools of People’s Bank of China relative to foreign reserves 
 





Note: In right-hand panel, required reserves equals change in the RRR in a given year times reservable deposits 
at year-end.  
 





Graph 4  RRR-adjusted reserve money (approach 1) and sterilisation tools in China 
 
Contributions to RRR-adjusted reserve money






1 Reserve money adjusted for changes in the RRR (RRR-adjusted reserve money) = reserve money + adjustment 
(Adj), where  Adjt = Adjt-
1 + (rt-1 – rt)*Dt-1, where adj is the adjustment, r is reserve requirement ratio and D is 
deposits; see Burger and Rasche (1977) for details. Starting month of adjustment (r0) is December 1999.  
 2 Year-on-year change in three-month moving average as percent of RRR-adjusted reserve money; a negative 
number means sterilization.   
3 Components of net domestic assets; year-on-year change in three-month moving average; in trillions of RMB; 
positive (negative) indicates injection (withdrawal) of liquidity.   
4 Net domestic assets other than effect of changes in RRR and PBC bond issue. 
 
Sources: PBC, CEIC and authors’ own estimates. 
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Graph 5  RRR-adjusted reserve money (approach 2) and sterilisation tools in China 
 
Contributions to RRR-adjusted reserve money






1  Reserve money adjusted for changes in the RRR (RRR-adjusted reserve money) = reserve money + adjustment 
(Adj), where Adjt =  (r0 – rt)*Dt, where adj is the adjustment, r is reserve requirement ratio and D is deposit; 
Starting month of adjustment (r0) is December 1999.  See Burger and Rasche (1977) for details.   
2  Year-on-year change in three-month moving average; as percent of RRR-adjusted reserve money; a negative 
number means sterilization.   
3  Components of net domestic assets; year-on-year change in three-month moving average; in trillions of RMB; 
positive (negative) indicates injection (withdrawal) of liquidity.   
4  Net domestic assets other than effect of changes in RRR and PBC bond issue. 
 




Graph 6  Foreign reserve accumulation in selective emerging market economies, % 
 
Foreign reserves of China    Change in foreign reserves





BR = Brazil; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; 
PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey. 
 
1  Including net position in forwards and futures in foreign currencies vis-à-vis domestic currency as percent of 
provisional GDP 2010. 
 
Sources: IMF IFS; IMF IRFCL; national data. 
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Graph 7  PBC bill yields, bank deposit rate and remuneration in China, % 
 












Graph 8  Required reserves, deposit rate, reserve money and bank loans, % 
 






1 Year-on-year growth of three-month moving average.     
2 Adjusted reserve money = reserve money + adjustment (Adj). Adjustment by approach 1 consists of accumulat-
ing reserves liberated or absorbed by changes in reserve requirement ratios in each period, that is  Adj1t = Adj1t-
1 + (rt-1 – rt)*Dt-1. Adjustment by approach 2 compares current reserve requirement ratio to a fixed initial pe-
riod of reserve requirement ratio, that is Adj2t = (r0 – rt)*Dt; where r is reserve requirement ratio and D is depos-
its; starting month of adjustment (r0) is December 1999. See Burger and Rasche (1977) for details. 
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Graph 9  Excess reserves in China, % 
 






1  Seasonal adjustment based on X-12 ARIMA, and fitted linear regression line is y = 6.6 – 0.13 t, where t is a 
quarterly trend variable.  
 







Graph 10  Loan growth, bank asset changes and reserves in China 
Average required, excess and total reserve ratios





1  Required reserve and excess reserve ratios are, respectively, required and excess reserves as percent of bank 
deposits. Total reserve ratio is the sum of required and excess reserve ratios.   
2  Loans in RMB and foreign currencies; year-on-year changes, in per cent.   
3  Quarterly change in total bank assets minus bank deposits at PBC.   
4  Outstanding aggregate for banking sector, lagged one quarter. 
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Graph 11  Reserves/deposits ratios and interbank rates in China, %1 
 
   Excess reserve ratio
2 and interest rates
3        Volatility





1  Required and excess reserve ratio are, respectively, required and excess reserves as percent of bank deposits.   
2  Two-month moving averages.   
3  Monthly averages.   
4  Two-week moving standard deviation. 
 






Graph 12  Discounted bill yields and new loans above lending floor in China, %  
 





1  Official 6-month lending rate. Required reserve ratio and excess reserve ratios are ratios of required reserves 
and excess reserves to bank deposits, respectively.  
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Graph 13  Net interest margin and spread in China, % 
 






1  Net interest margin is the difference of interest income and interest expense divided by earning assets; net in-
terest spread is the difference between average yield on interest-earning assets and average cost of interest-
bearing liabilities.  








Graph 14  Bank profits and net interest margin 
 





AU = Australia; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; 
PH = Philippines; PK = Pakistan; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TW = Chinese Taipei. 
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Graph 15  Non-financial corporate debt securities 
 











Graph 16  Corporate loans and bank assets 
 





Note: Risk-weighted and unweighted bank assets are for  the twelve public Chinese banks listed in Table 4.  
Source: CEIC and authors’ own estimates. 
  Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 





















No 1  Aaron Mehrotra and Jenni Pääkkönen: Comparing China's GDP statistics with coincident indicators  
No 2  Marco Lo Duca and Tuomas Peltonen: Macro-financial vulnerabilities and future financial stress -  Assessing 
  systemic risks and predicting systemic events 
No 3  Sabine Herrmann and Dubravko Mihaljek:  The determinants of cross-border bank flows to emerging  
  markets: New empirical evidence on the spread of financial crises 
No 4  Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra: Financial settlement modes and corruption: Evidence from developed 
  nations 
No 5  Aaron Mehrotra, Riikka Nuutilainen and Jenni Pääkkönen: Changing economic structures and impacts of 
  shocks - evidence from a DSGE model for China 
No 6  Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill Do markets perceive sukuk and conventional 
  bonds as different financing instruments?  
No 7  Petr Jakubik: Households’ response to economic crisis 
No 8  Wing Thye Woo: China's economic growth engine: The likely types of hardware failure, software failure and 
  power supply failure 
No 9   Juan Carlos and Carmen Broto: Flexible inflation targets, forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in 
  emerging countries 
No 10  Andrei Yakovlev: State-business relations in Russia in the 2000s: From the capture model to a variety of 
  exchange models? 
No 11  Olena Havrylchyk: The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit  in transition economies 
No 12   Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra: The Economic transmission of fiscal policy shocks 
   from Western to Eastern Europe 
No 13   Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Aaron Mehrotra: What drives urban consumption in mainland China?  
  The role of property price dynamics 
No 14  Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen: Conditionality in Chinese bilateral lending 
No 15  John Knight and Wei Wang: China's macroeconomic imbalances: causes and consequences 
No 16  Gregory C Chow, Changjiang Liu and  Linlin Niu: Co-movements of Shanghai and New York stock prices by 
  time-varying regressions  
No 17  Yanbing Zhang, Xiuping Hua, Liang Zhao: Monetary policy and housing prices; a case study of Chinese 
  experience in 1999-2010 
No 18  Peter Sarlin, Tuomas A. Peltonen: Mapping the state of financial stability 
No 19  Zhichao Zhang, Nan Shi, Xiaoli Zhang: China’s New exchange rate regime, optimal basket currency and 
  currency diversification 
No 20  Elena B. Deryugina, Alexey A. Ponomarenko: Identifying structural shocks behind loan supply fluctuations  
  in Russia 
No 21  Dong He and Honglin Wang: Dual-track interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy in China  
No 22   Xinhua He, Duo Qin and Yimeng Liu: Exchange rate misalignments: A comparison of China today against 
  recent historical experiences of Japan, Germany, Singapore and Taiwan 
No 23  Vladimir Mau: The role of state and creation of a market economy in Russia  
No 24  Elena Fedorova: Transfer of financial risk in emerging eastern European stock markets: A sectoral 
  perspective 
No25  Yin-Wong Cheung, Eiji Fujii: Exchange Rate Misalignment Estimates – Sources of Differences 
No26  William Pyle: The ownership of industrial land in Russian cities: Explaining patterns of privatization  
  across regions and firms 
No 27  Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and Carsten A. Holz: Explaining money demand in China  
  during the transition from a centrally planned to a market-based monetary system 
No 28  Maria Semenova: Save or borrow - what determines Russian households’ financial strategies? 
No 29  Pierre Pessarossi and Laurent Weill: Choice of Corporate Debt in China: The Role of State Ownership 
No 30  Guonan Ma, Yan Xiandong and Liu Xi: China’s evolving reserve requirements 
 
 





















   
 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
PO Box 160 
FIN-00101 Helsinki 
 
 + 358 10 831 2268 
bofit@bof.fi 
  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 